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The evidence presented in this paper leads to three conclusions about
possible effects on the U.S. long-term capital raising mechanism due to the
sharp increase in interest rate volatility that has followed the Federal
Reserve System's adoption of new monetary policy procedures in 1979. First,
the increased volatility has probably led nonfinancial corporations to finance
less of their external funds requirements at long term than they would other-
wise have done. Second, the increased volatility has probably led underwriters
of high grade corporate bonds to increase the spread of a typical new issue's
yield over the prevailing market yield on comparable bonds already outstanding.
Third, there is little firm basis (reported here, anyway) to conclude that
the increased volatility in particular has affected investors' portfolio
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The object of this paper is to examine in detail, on the basis of
the experience of the U.S. financial markets under the Federal Reserve
Systems new monetary policy procedures announced on October 6, 1979, one
potentially important effect on the nonfinancial economy due to the resulting
increase in interest rate volatility -—inparticular, the possibility
that increased volatility has impaired the market mechanism for raising
long—term business capital.
Interest rate volatility has been a controversial issue in central
bank policy making for a long time. The ultimate objectives that central
banks pursue almost always refer to nonfinancial aspects of economic activity
andwell-being,like price stability andeconomicgrowth. In carrying out
policies designed to further these ebject±ves, however, central banks typically
operate exclusively in the financial markets. Their actions therefore affect
interest rates directly and visibly. Whether to use this influence on
interest rates to smooth out short—run fluctuations, or alternatively to
implement actions focused solely on other objectives, and hence leave
interest rates to vary freely with the pulse of market pressures, is the
central question.
In the United States the evolution of the Federal Reserve System's
monetary policy procedures during the last decade, including in particular
the changes announced in October 1979, in effect reversed the attitude—2—
toward interest rate volatility that had marked the first half-century of
American central banking. When the Congress first established the Federal
Reserve System in 1913, acting in response to a history of financial market
disorders that had periodically depressed business activity, it charged the
new central bank "to provide an elastic currency" to accommodate the economy's
financing needs. That prescription led the Federal Reserve, through most
of its existence, to pursue a policy aimed at stabilizing interest rate
movements. By 1970, however, the drawbacks of focusing monetary policy on
nominal interest rates in an era of rapid andvolatileprice inflation had
become apparent, andtheFederal Reserve shifted to a policy framewOrk
basedon targeted growth rates for selected monetary aggregates. The imple-
mentation of the monetary targets strategy during the l970s led to some
increase in short-run interest rate volatility. Still, volatility remained
limited, in large part because the Federal Reserve used a short—term
interest rate (the federal funds rate) as the instrument by which it sought
to control the monetary aggregates.
On October6,1979, the Federal Reserve publiclyreaffirmed its
commitment to the monetary targets framework and also announced a new set
ofoperating procedures that, in effect, amounted to using the quantity of
nonborrowed bank reserves as the instrument for controlling the monetary
aggregates. As almost any theory of monetary policy would have predicted,
the short—run volatility of short—terminterest rates increased immediately
and sharply. Inaddition,the short-run volatilityof long-term interest
ratesincreased as well. The amplitude of interest rate swings during the
one—and—a—halfbusiness cycles that have occurred since October 1979 has
been unprecedented in U.S. financial experience. Moreover, the volatility
of interest rates over shorter time horizons —month—to—month, day—to—day,—3—
and even within the trading day —has also increaseddramatically.
From a public policy perspective, however, the question is:so what?
Why does interest rate volatility matter? Are whatever effects itmay have
quantitatively important? Does increased interest rate volatility constitutea
significant drawback, possibly even one that may warrant discarding an other-
wise useful way of conducting monetary policy?
To date economists and other commentators on monetary policy procedures
have provided little serious analysis of the effects of interest ratevolatility.
Quantitative studies of the subject before October 1979 typically just tried
to estimate how much interest rate volatility would follow from adopting
one monetary policy framework or another, without going on to say anything
about what would happen as a result of that volatility. Today, aftermore
than two years of experience under the Federal Reserve's new procedures,
the amount of volatility is readily observable but the question of its
consequences still remains largely unexplored in any systematic way.'
Moreover, even the informal discussions of the increased interest rate volatil-
ity since October 1979 have usually focused on its consequences strictly
within the financial markets. In the final analysis, however, purely financial
effects without any nonfinancial counterpart hardly constitute grounds for
choosing one monetary policy framework over another.
On occasions when discussions of interest rate volatility have addressed
the crucial question of effects on the nonfinancial economy, perhaps the
most familiar idea to be raised is the possibility that increased volatility
may impair the market mechanism for raising long—term capital for business
fixed investment. If true, that would be a very important effect indeed.
The U.S. economy's capital markets are unique in their ability to provideborrowers with long—term funds. The nonfinancial corporate business sector
in particular relies heavily on external funds to finance its investment in
new plant and equipment, and historically the great bulk of such external
funds have come from borrowing at long term. Especially now that increased
physical capital formation to spur the U.S. economy's productivity and
international competitiveness has become a widely accepted goal of public
policy, any significant erosion of the market system's ability to provide
the requisite financial capital would present cause for serious concern.
Although impairment of the capital raising mechanism is by no means the only
possible effect of increased interest rate volatility, it is surely among
the most important.
Exploring the effects of increased interest rate volatility on the
long-term capital raising mechanism is the primary objective of this paper.
Hence this analysis too deals with effects strictly within the financial
markets.2 what would ultimately matter for the determination of policy in
this context, of course, is the further implication of any change in the
capital raising mechanism on fixed capital formation. In principle it
would be possible to undertake a direct analysis of the effects of increased
volatility on actual physical investment and other aspects of nonfinancial
economic activity. Nevertheless, the accumulated experience since October
1979 is still too brief in comparison to the time lags involved, and too
manyrelevant factors have undergone substantial change during these few
years, to warrant confidence in ananalysisrelating the post—1979 movement
infixed investment behavior to the increase in interest rate volatility.
Instead, the compromise sought here is to focus on the long—term capital
raising mechanism, thereby coming as close as possible to physical capital
formation decisions while still limiting the analysis to phenomena observed
within the financial markets.—5—
Section I seeks to determine whether U.S. nonfinancial business
corporations have raised less of their external funds in the form of long—term
debt as a result of the increased interest rate volatility since October
1979. Because business conditions have hardly been "normal" during 1980 and
1981, simply comparing the bond share of total financing in these years with
the average bond share in prior years is of little value. The operational
question, instead, is whether a well developed model of corporations' bond
financing that explains the data satisfactorily before October 1979 fails to
do so thereafter. The specific model used here to address this question
relates corporations' long—term borrowing, for a given external deficit to
be financed, to a combination of portfolio substitution and expectation
effects based on the prevailing pattern of interest rates on alternative
financing strategies.
SectionII takes as given the amount of long-term corporate borrowing
done since October 1979 and seeks to determine whether the financial markets
havemade corporations pay more for the underwriting and initial distribution
of this debt. The most obvious measure of new issue costs for publicly
offered debt, the spread between the yields at which investment banking
syndicates buy new securities from issuers and sell them to investors, has
remained essentially fixed for many years on issues priced by negotiation and
usually varies for largely independent reasons on issues priced by competitive
bidding. Another important element of new issue costs, however, is the
spread between the yield at which investors initially buy new securities and
the currently prevailing yield on comparable securities already outstanding.
This elementof the interest rate on new issues is also a genuine cost of
borrowing to the corporation, and at times it is a larger costthan that
dueto the underwriting spread. Using data on five different categories of—6—
long—term corporate bond issues, the analysis here compares the average
values of this spread before and after the 1979 increase in interest rate
volatility.
Section III again takes as given the amount of long-term corporate
borrowing and seeks to determine whether the pattern of distribution of this
debt has changed since October 1979. One consequence of the increased
interest rate volatility frequently alleged by market participants is that
the U.S. long—term bond market has become a vehicle more for "speculation"
than for "investment." Although several possible operational renderings of
that proposition lie beyond the scope of this paper, it is straightforward
to determine whether specific classes of investors —-forexample, life
insurance companies, or private pension funds, or individuals -—haveplayed
a greater or lesser role in long-term lending than in prior years. To the
extent that these classes of investors typically exhibit portfolio behavior
which is more homogeneous within classes than across classes, such shifts
in the distribution of bond holdings also signify changes in the behavior
of the overall market.
Section IV briefly summarizes the paper's empirical findings and
re—emphasizes some important caveats.—7—
I. Efft of Volatility on the Volume ofLong—Term Corporate Financing
In considering ways in which the recent increase in interest rate
volatility may have effected the U.S. financial markets, and the implications
that any such effects may have for choosing a monetary policy framework, it
is best to start from the fundamentals. Despite the life of theirown that
financial markets seem to lead, the basic role of the financial markets. in
any economy is to facilitate nonfinancial economic activity. In an advanced
economy like that of the United States, one of the most important specific
ways in which the financial markets serve this function is by coordinating
the independent actions of real savers and real investors that together
determine the economy's physical capital formation.
One of the most widely recognized priorities in American economic
policy today is the need to increase the nation's capital formation. Although
economists and others continue to debate the reasons underlying the slowdown
in U.S. productivity growth during the 1970s, there is broad agreement that
additional investment in plant and equipment would contribute to a recovery
of productivity growth --andhence growth of the nation's standard of
living --inthe future. Meanwhile, however, the capital formation rate
has been not rising but falling. After a sharp increase in the l960s attri-
butable to specific investment incentives legislated early in the decade,
investment in business plant and equipment (net of replacement for depreciation
and obsolescence) declined from 4.0% of the gross national product on
average during 1966-70 to 2.8% on average during 1976-80. Reversing this
decline has become a major priority of public policy.
Financial markets are relevant to this objective because every physical
investment decision has its financial counterpart. More to the point, the
financial transactions associated with physical capital formation are not—8—
merely a reflection of real resource allocations that would necessarily come
about in any case. The setting in which the financing of capital formation
takes place can also importantly affect the allocation of real resources,
including the total amount of capital formation as well as its composition.
If increased interest rate volatility were to impair the market mechanism
for financing capital formation, in the end it would restrict the economy's
ability to undertake capital formation too.
Because corporations in nonfinancial lines of business regularly
account for nearly three—quarters of all plant and equipment investment in
the United States, it makes sense to focus the analysis on the economy's
nonfinancial corporate sector. U.S. nonfinancial corporations typically
rely heavily on external funds from the markets to finance their capital
expenditures. External funds constituted 45.5% of total sources of funds for
these firms, on average during the decade ending in 1980. Given U.S. corpor-
ations' traditional reluctance to raise equity capital except by retaining
earnings, most of the external funds raised are usually in debt form (92.2%
during 1971—80). Moreover, given the risk-averse preference for using
obligations of longer maturity to finance investment in long-lived facilities,
most of this debt has taken the form of bonds, mortgages, or other long-term
instruments. Despite the much discussed increase in reliance on short—term
debt in the l970s, net new issues of long—term obligations accounted for an
average 72.4% of all credit market borrowing by U.S. nonfinancial corporations
during 1971-80, and long-term obligations constituted 72.2% of these
corporations'total debt outstanding as of yearend 1980.
Has this pattern changed significantly since the Federal Reserve System
implemented its new policy procedures? A simple inspection of financing data
revealsthat business reliance on short—term debt has indeed been high since—9—
October1979. Concluding that something fundamentalhas changed is a more
subtlematter, however. To begin, only twoyearsof experience does not
constitute much of a laboratory for judging changes in economic behavior.
Further, the pattern of the business cycle and of interest rate movements
(wholly apart from short-run volatility) has been extraordinary during these
years. Any judgment that a change in corporate financing behavior has
occurred, which may have resulted from increased interest rate volatility,
must therefore rely on a model that takes account of as many key factors as
possible other than the increased volatility.
The model of nonfinancial corporations' long—term borrowing developed
in Friedman [71cOmbines the familiar linear homogeneousmodel of portfolio
allocation, applied to the selection of desired liabilities to finance
externally a given cumulated deficit,
L*
N e — =krk + 'if .,i=1,.. ., N (1)
Dt
with the optimal marginal adjustment model of portfolio adjustment in the
presenceof transactions costs,
AL.t =Oik tDt_1 - + AtADt, i=1,.. ., N (2)
whereL is the corporation's desired amount of the i-th liability outstanding
=D);D is the corporation's total cumulated external deficit, and AD
its flow change; r is the expected "borrowing period" yield on the k-th
liability; L. is the corporation's actual amountof,and AL. the change in,
thei—th liability outstanding (L. =D,AL. =AD);subscript t indicates
eachparticular time period; and the ik' and Oikarefixed coefficients
that satisfy3. =0for all k, 'if. =1,and e.= 0for all k, with 0
iik 1 1 1 ik
arbitrary.—10—
Theprimary rationale motivating the use of the linear homogeneous
portfolio selection model is, as usual, its convenience and tractability.
In a single—period context, the assumption of constant relative risk aversion
and joint normally distributed yield assessments is sufficient to render
the linear homogeneous model optimal.3 Some adjustment model is then
necessary in a multi—period context in the presence of transactions costs.
The principal advantage of the optimal marginal adjustment model for this pur-
pose is that it represents, in a tractable way, the increased yield sensitivity
of the allocation of the flow AD in comparison with the re-allocation of the
stock Dt1. This distinction is especially relevant when, as is the case in
the United States, most long—term corporate liabilities are non-callable for
at least some substantial time (typically five years for utility companies
and ten years for other corporate borrowers) after the date of issue.4
Because of the non—callability of corporate bonds, the corporation's
choice between long— and short-term financing at any time is more complex than
a simple comparison of the prevailing yields on long- and short-term debt
instruments. A decision not to finance at long—term leaves open the possi-
bility of continually rolling over short-term debt, as well as the possibility
of relying on short-term debt only temporarily and issuing long-term debt
later on. At the least, therefore, the financing decision depends on the
currently prevailing long-term yield, the expected average long-term yield
in the future, and the expected average short-term yield currently and in
thefuture.5Hence rewriting (1) for the specific case of long—term bonds
gives (at a minimum)
=BlrB+ BtBt + B3t + B
where B* is the corporation's desired amount of bonds outstanding, rB is the—11—
currently prevailing yield on new issues of the corporation's bonds, r is
the corporation's expectation of the average future value of rB and is
the corporation's expectation of the average current and future yield on its
short—term securities.
Combining (3) with the relevant component of (2) then gives, as a
specific expression for the corporation's net new issues of long—term bonds,
£Bt =TrB•AD+ [(iieBk)] Dti
+ B1rB + [(kl.0Bk)1BteDt_1
+ B2rB+[($k20Bk)1tDt_l
+ B3rS + kk30Bk
0B L 4 -
BBt-l kB Bk k,t-l
whereB is the amount of,and B the change in, bonds outstanding. The
optimalfinancing model implies Bl <0 < B2'B3 The optimal adjustment
model implies 0BB >0 (so that the coefficient on Bti is negative). Hence
four of the model's coefficients have known signs a priori. The signs of
and the 0Bk' kB, are not known a priori, nor is the sign of any of the
combinationsshownwithinsquare brackets in (4) knowna priori.
Theresult of estimating (4)for the aggregate net new issues of bonds
byU.S. corporate businesses, using quarterly data for 1960:1 —1979:IIIand
autoregressive proxies (descrthe3 be1dw) for the unobservable interest rate
expectations:, is









2O79 sE=898 H=1.72 (5)—12—
whereS is the nonfinancial corporate business sector's outstanding stock of
short-term debt (including bank loans, commercialpaper, finance company
loans,and U.S.government loans), and the numbers in parentheses are
t—statistics.2 is the coefficientof determination adjusted for degrees
of freedom, SE is the standard error of estimate (in millions of dollarsper
quarter), and H is Durbin's H—statistic. All four terms in (4) with
coefficients consisting of sums of products of parameters in the underlying
model are omitted in (5), since in each case there is no a priori expectation
of a nonzero coefficient, and in each case preliminary experimentation did
not indicate a value significantly different from zero atany reasonable
level.6 The expressions for thetwo interest rate expectations, generated
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=0.0471
S11=0.0915 'l7 =0.0690
=0.0477 12 0.0997 l8 =0.0398—13—
where the particular interest rates used forrB and r are, respectively,
the yield on new issues of long-term utility company bonds rated Aaby Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., and the yield on prime 4-6 month commercialpaper.
Apart from the slow adjustment speed indicated by the small (and
insignificant) value for 0BB' the estimated coefficients in (5) are all
plausible in the context of the underlying theory of long-term borrowing
behavior.The coefficients of the three yield terms in particular each have
the expected respective sign and a satisfactory significance level. The
equation fits reasonably well overall, and the H-statistic doesnot
indicatesignificant .erial correlation. Only four of the equation's. 78
estimatedresiduals exceed two standard errors in absolute value, and none
exceeds three standard errors.
If the relationship estimated in (5) represents nonfinancial business
corporations'long-term borrowing behavior through September 1979, conditional
oncorporations' external deficit, their existing mix of long- and short—term
debtoutstanding, and the pattern oflong- and short—term interest rate
movements,has the corresponding experience since October 1979 (again,
conditionalon all of the same factors) indicated a significant change?
Table 1 shows the out-of—sampleprediction errors made by this equation for
eachof the sevenquarters beginning in October 1979.The table also shows
theestimated residuals for the last three quarters of the sample period, for
purposes of immediate comparison.
The values presented in Table 1 show that the equation which describes
nonfinancial corporations' borrowing behavior before October 1979 clearly
fails to do so thereafter. In contrast to the absence of any within-sample
residuals greater than three standard deviations, the out-of—sample prediction
error is greater than three standard deviations in five of sevenquarters.TABLE 1
LONG-TERMBORROWINGEQUATION PREDICTION ERRORS
Actual Predicted Multiple
Long-Term Long-Term of Standard
Borrowing Borrowing Error Error
In-Sample
1979:1 5,500 4,190 1,310 l.5
1979:11 5,328 4,775 553 0.6
1979:111 4,841 6,475 —1,635 —1.8
Out-of-Sample
l979:IV 5,490 6,285 —795 —0.9
1980:1 7,613 3,519 4,094 4.6
1980:11 10,021 9,380 643 0.7
1980:111 8,107 13,896 —5,789 —6.4
1980:IV 4,705 15,126 —10,431 —11.6
1981:1 7,118 11,009 —3,891 —4.3
1981:11 3,143 14,491 —11,348 —12.6
Notes: Values (except for multiple of standard error) are in millions of
dollars.—14—
Indeed,several of the prediction errors exceed the equation's standard
error by absurd amounts.
Inaddition, the pattern of sustained under-prediction of long-term
borrowing beginning at midyear 1980 also suggests that some factorrepresenting
a break from prior experiencehad come intoplay. Two specific aspects of
thisseries of negative values bear comment. First, as is clear from the
actual versus predicted values shown in the table, the problem is not the
familiar story of data moving into a new range into which an equation, with
its coefficients presumably biased toward zero, cannot follow.Instead,
given the size of corporations' external deficits and the other explanatory
variables, the equation predicts a sharp rise in long—term borrowing which
(except for 1980:11) never materialized. Second, the series of large (in
absolute value) residuals of the same sign stands in stark contrast to the
within-sample pattern of nearly adjacent offsetting residuals. During the
last three quarters of the sample, for example, the —1.8 standard deviation
residual in 1979:111 about offset the 1.5 standard deviation residual in
1979:1. Similarly, the only four in-sample residuals to exceed 2.0 standard
deviationsalso occurred in a nearly adjacent and offsetting way (2.2 and -2.8
standarddeviations in 1975:1 and 1975:111, respectively, and —2.5 and 2.8 in
1977:11 and l977:IV respectively).8
At a moze formal level, a chow test for the null hypothesis that
the equation's coefficients estimated over 1960:11 -1979:111remained
unchanged when estimated over 1960:11 —1981:11produced an F—statistic of
6.10 ——farin excess of the 2.93 value needed to reject the null hypothesis
at the 1% significance level. By contrast, the result of an analogous Chow
test for stability of the equation's coefficients over the 1960:11 —1977:IV
versus 1960:11 —1979:111samples (that is, deleting the last seven observations—15—
instead of adding seven more) did not warrant rejecting the null hypothesis,
even at the more standard 5% level.
Because the •k coefficients in the underlying portfolio selection
model (1) depend on the variarice—covariance structure of the joint distribu-
tion of the associated yields, it is not surprising that a sharp increase
in interest rate volatility like that which occurred after 1979:111 would
have led to instability in an estimated relationship like (5)•9 Indeed,
the results in this regard go further than the Chow test's rejection of the
joint stability of all of the model's coefficients. The results of estimating
(4) over 1960:11 —1981:11,incorporating shift variables allowing the three
Bi coefficients to assume different values during 1979:IV -1981:11,indicated
significant evidence of a shift in each of thethree)0
It is also useful to distinguish the respective roles of coefficient
shiftsversus expectation proxy errors in accounting for the over—prediction
of bond financing shown in Table 1.11 Theautoregressiveproxy for long—
termyieldexpectations(6) closely tracked movements in actual long-term
yields throughout the post—sample period. By contrast, the autoregressive
proxy for short—term yield expectations (7) was typically below the actual
level of short-term yields during this period. Because the expectations that
presumablymatter for corporations' financing decisions are unobservable,
these relationships do not necessarilyindicate either success or failure
of the autoregressive expectations proxies. To the extent that the low
values generated by (7) do indicate a failure of the expectations proxy,
however, given B3 >0thatfailure is in the direction opposite to that
neededto account for the over—prediction of long-term borrowing. On the
basis of this limited evidence, therefore, the over—prediction does appear
to be attributable to a shift in the portfoliobehavior represented by (1),—16—
rather than to a failure of the autoregressive expectationsproxies (6) and
(7).
In sum, the evidence provided by an empirical model of nonfinancial
business corporations' long—term borrowing behavior showsa significant
break between the post October 1979 experience and therelationships that
prevailed over the prior two decades. Moreover, since mid 1980 the change
from prior behavior has been in the direction of less long—term borrowing
than would previously have been consistent with corporations' overallborrowing
requirements and other factors affecting the financing decision.—17-
II. Effects of Volatility on the Costs of Corporate Financing
The evidence presented in Section I, which shows a shift away from
long-term financing by U.S. nonfinancial business corporations, takes as
given the prevailing level of short— and long—term interest rates. To the
extent that that evidence indicates an effect of the post October 1979
increase in interest rate volatility on corporations' financing decisions,
therefore, it abstracts from effects directly associated with interest rate
levels. Such effects may be highly important, however. If the combination
of borrowers' and lenders' reactions to increased volatility has been to
raise the equilibrium level of long— relative to short—term interest rates,
the model of corporate financing behavior in (5) indicates that over time
corporations would finance less of a given external funds requirement at
long term. Moreover, models of business plant and equipment investment in the
tradition of Jorgenson [11] and Bischoff [l] indicate that over time an
increase in long—term interest rates would also depress capital expenditures,
so that there would be less external deficit to finance -—andless capital
formation to contribute to the economy's productivity.
Because of the short time interval that has elapsed since October 1979,
togetherwith the extraordinary pattern of business cycle developments during
this interval, itissimply too soon to draw a judgment about the extent (if
any) to which the increase in interest rate volatility has altered fundamental
relationships either among various interest rates or between interest rates
collectively and expected price inflation. The swings in the slope of the
maturity yield curve have been unprecedented during the past two-and-a-half
years, but then so have the swings in interest rates themselves. On average,
long—term rates have been somewhat below short—term rates, but such an
"inverted" relationship is not unknown, especially at times of weak business—18—
activity. Just within the past year, both long- andshort-terminterest
rates have been unusually high in comparison to observed current price
inflation, but the conflicting cross—currents at work have preventedeasy
inferences about the more important expectations of future price inflation.
Even if data were available to support a judgmentthat correctlyinferred
real interest rates were abnormally high, it would be impossible to have
confidence in the attribution of this phenomenon to increased interest rate
12
volatility.
By contrast, one aspect of interest rate determination about which an
inference of this kind maybeplausible on the basis of the limited experience
since October 1979 is the cost of long—term borrowing bycorporations over
and above the interest rate prevailing in the bond market atany given time.
This cost is less fundamental in the sense of basic economic theory, but to
the corporate borrower (or would—be borrower) it is no less real thanany
other component of the cost of borrowing. If a corporation mustpay an
additional 1% per annum to borrow, it does not much matter whether the
increment reflects a higher equilibrium interest rate level, as in most
theoretical models, or a higher cost of borrowing over and above the equilibrium
level. The fact that most theoretical models assume away any market imperfec-
tions that could account for a cost above the equilibrium level is of no
comfort.
The most obvious element of the difference between the interest rate
paid by corporate borrowers and the prevailing market clearing rate is the
"spread" between the yield (price) at which corporations sell new bond issues
to underwriting syndicates and the yield (price) at which those syndicates in
turn sell the bondsto investors. This spread is the syndicate members'
compensation for managing, underwriting, and distributing the new securities.—3.9—
Whatlittle variation in this spread has taken place, however, does not
suggest any response to increased interest rate volatility. The spread on
high grade long-term bonds priced by negotiation between the issuing corpor-
ationand the underwriting syndicate has remained essentially unchanged at
$8.75 per $1,000 of parvalue for more than twodecades, despite the presumed
greaterunderwriting risk associated with increased interest rate volatility
overmany years. The spread on bonds priced by competitive bidding among
rivalunderwriting syndicates: (almost always issued by utility companies:)
is sometimes greater and sometimes smaller than $8.75; but its variation
over tire primarily reflects the ever shiftingcompetitive pressures within
the investment banking industry, rather than any changes in specific external
factors.
A second element of the difference between the interestrate paid by
corporateborrowers and the prevailing market clearing rate, which has shown a
sharp change sinceOctober 1979, isthe spread between theyield (price) at
whichunderwriting syndicates sell new bond issues to investors and the yield
(price)at which comparable issues already outstanding are then trading.
Although the spread between new issue and seasoned yields is less straight-
forward to analyze or even to measure than the underwriting spread, it is also
a genuine cost of borrowing to the corporation, and at times it is a larger
cost than that due to the underwriting spread.
Conard and Frankena[3], intheir classic study of the new issue versus
seasoned yield spread in the U.S. corporate bond market, hypothesized that one
explanation for the existence of a positive spread is that it reduces under-
writing risk. By pricing new securities at a discount in comparison to
comparablesecurities already outstanding, underwriters can enhance prospects
ofrapid distribution of the new issue and therefore minimize the risks—20—
inherent in holding large amounts of the securities for severaldays or even
weeks. The simultaneous existence of the underwriting spread and thenew
issue versus seasoned spread gives underwriters two tools with which tocope
with a changing market environment. In response to an increase in under-
writing risk associated with increased interest rate volatility, underwriters
can either go ahead and assume the added risk and charge compensation for it
by increasing the purchase versus sale spread, or else offset the added risk
by increasing the new issue versus seasoned spread. Although neither Conard
and Frankena nor Ederington [4 ]foundclear cut evidence for such behavior,
neither study's sample period (1952—63 and 1964—71, respectively) withessed
anything like the increase in interest rate volatility that has occurred since
13
October 1979.
The firstthree columns of Table 2show the number of issues, and
themeanand standard deviation of the same—day spread between each new
issue'syield and Moody's comparable seasoned yield index, for five distinct
categoriesof U.S. long-term corporate bond issues first for the period
including 1977, 1978 and 1979 through September, and then for the period
including 1980 and 1981.14 Although the standard deviations are large,
indicating a substantial range of spreads, in four of the five categories
the mean spread exhibited a sharp increase after October 1979. For each of the
three categories of utility bonds (including telephone issues), the mean spread
rose from zero or slightly negative to about 50 basis points, or 1/2% per, annum.
For Aa—rated industrials the mean spread rose from about zero to 1/8% per annum.
Only in the case of A—rated industrials did the mean spread remain unchanged
(at1/8% per annum). For all five categories combined, the mean spread was
—4basispoints before October 1979and38basispoints thereafter.
Asis well known from the work of Conard and Frankena, unadjustedTABLE 2
NEW ISSUEVERSUS SEASONED CORPORATE BOND YIELDS, 1977 -1981
Number MeanStandard MeanSpreadAdjusted
of Issues Spread Deviation for Coupon Differentials
Adjusted Adjusted
by Eq. (8) by Eq. (9)
January1977September1979
Aaa Bell Telephone Issues27 0 11 3 —6
Aa Utility Issues 36 —13 24 —17 —28
Baa Utility Issues 32 —3 45 —3 —3
Aa Industrial Issues 13 —2 23 10 —21
A Industrial Issues 10 13 37 —10 —8
January 1980 -December1981
Aaa Bell Telephone Issues 18 53 50 45 41
Aa Utility Issues 18 42 58 37 18
Baa Utility Issues 17 53 52 50 61
Aa Industrial Issues 6 13 39 22 12
A Industrial Issues 18 12 64 14 27
Notes: Mean and standard deviation are in basis points.
Dataexclude issues of intermediate—term, convertible,and original—
issuediscountbonds, and allbonds issuedby foreign borrowers.
Data include all other issues of straight long—term debt, by domestic
borrowers within thespecified categories, with par value at least $100
million for Aaa Bell Telephone, Aa utility andAa industrial issues, $50
million for A industrial issues, and $30million for Baa utility issues.
Datafrom Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Morgan Stanley & Co.,
Incorporated.—21—
spreads like those shown in the second column of Table 2may be misleading
because of coupon differences between specific new issues and theoutstanding
issues used to compute the comparable seasoned yield indices. If twoother-
wise identical bonds bore different coupons but traded at thesame yield
nonetheless, the bond with the lower coupon would be more attractive to
investors because of the lower probability of call. Inaddition, taxable
investors would find the bond with the lowercoupon (and hence lower price)
more attractive because part of the return to holding it would take the
form of capital gain and would therefore be subject to preferential tax
treatment. For both reasons investors would bid up the price of the bond
with the lower coupon so that in market equilibrium it traded at a lower
overall yield. Hence when long-term interest rates in general are high in
comparison to the coupons on the bonds that make up the comparable seasoned
yield indices, so that the bonds in the index are trading at discounts from
par, some positive spread between a new issue's yield and the comparable
seasoned index is to be expected. Because the average level of long-term
interest rates was sharply higher during 1980—81 than during 1977-79 (14.61%
versus 9.22% for new issues of Aa—rated utility bonds, for example), it is
at least possible that the rise in new issue versus seasoned yield spreads
documented in Table 2 simply relected the associated coupon differentials
rather than any effect on the market pricing mechanism due to increased
interest rate volatility. Hence some allowance for the coupon differential
is necessary.
In the absence of an exact measure of the relevant coupon differential
for each new bond issue,'5 one way to control for the effect of changing
coupon differentials on new issue versus seasoned yield spreads in this
context is to relate the observed spread directly to the seasoned yield,—22—
as in the regression
(r.-r.) = t3+r.,+D.+(Dr.) (8) Ni Si 0 iSiOi ii Si
where rN is the yield on an individual new issue and r5 the yield on the
comparable Moody's seasoned yield index on the day of that new issue, both
measured in basis points; D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the new issue
appeared in the 1980-81 part of the sample and 0 otherwise; and the i subscript
indicates a specific new issue. The rationale underlying (8) is that, for a
given sample of bonds comprising the seasoned yield index, and for new issues
priced approximately at par (which is usually the case), movements in the
seasoned yield index r will be closely and positively correlated with move-
ments in the differential between the coupon on each new issue and the mean
coupon on the bonds comprising the index. To the extent that movements in
are a valid proxy for movements in the coupon differential, the implied
coupon—adjusted yield spread is a simple function of the intercept and slope
values in (8) together with the value of the mean coupon on the bonds in
the index.'6 Because the presence of the dummy variable in (8) allows the
intercept and slope to shift after October 1979, it also allows the implied
coupon—adjusted yield spread to change.
The use of movements in r5 as a proxy for movements in the new issue
versus seasoned yield index coupon differential in (8) is subject to two
biases which act in opposite directions. First, because the mere existence
of a positive coupon differential will cause a positive spread (rN— rh),
movements of r5 would understate the movement of the differential if the
bonds used in compiling the seasoned index remained umchanged throughout the
sample. Second, because Moody's Investors Service does change the composition
of each index over time, however, typically by substitutions that bring the—23—
averagecoupon of the included bonds more nearly into line with prevailing
new issue yields, movements ofr would overstate the movement of the coupon
differential if there were no resulting yield differential. On balance,
how good a proxyr8 is for the coupon differential in a regression context
depends on the extent to which these two biases offset one another.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating (8) for each of the five
categories of bond issues included in Table 2, first subject to the constraint
== 0,next subject only to the constraint =0(so that the intercept
may differ in the two parts of each sample), and finally subject to no con-
straint (so that both the intercept and the slope may differ). The basic
regressions with & = 0consistently show in the expected positive
effect of the coupon differential (proxied byre), ranging from a maximum
of 14 basis points of yield spread per 1% of coupon differential for Aaa-
rated telephone issues to a minimum of 7basispoints of spread per 1% of
differentialfor A—rated industrials. The intercepts areuniformly
negative because the correction for the average difference between the mean
levelof r andthe mean level of the coupon differential exceeds the mean
yieldspread after adjustment for the differential. The overall fit of the
equations, and with it the significance level of the estimated slope
coefficients, varies from surprisingly strong for the telephone issues to
negligible for the A-rated industrials.
Theresults of estimating (8) with either the intercept or the inter-
cept and the slope free to differ across the two subsamples are mixed. With
=0still, the intercept shift typically does not significantly differ
from zero. With both coefficients free to change, the slope shiftl is
uniformly positive, andsignificantlyso (at least marginally) for three













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































significantly so for the same three categories.
The fourth column of Table 2 reports mean new issue versus seasoned
yield spreads that are comparable to those shown in the second column but
adjusted for the effects of changing coupon differentials on the basis of the
respective sets of estimated ''and l values reported in Table 3
forthe form of (8) with bothand lestimated freely.17 The adjusted
means for each specific category of issues differ somewhat from the unadjusted
means, as is to be expected, but the widespread increase from the earlier
to the latter part of the sample is still apparent. For all five categories
combined, the mean adjusted spread was -5 basis points befOre October 1979
and35basis points after January 1980.
Although (8) includes a proxy variable to control for the coupon
differential between new issues and the bonds comprising the comparable
seasoned yield indices, it does not control for any of the other factors that
both researchers and investment bankers have traditionally suggested as deter-
minantsof new issue pricing. 2nexpanded relation that includes three other




+4(Ar].) +50D. ÷1(D..r.) (9)
whererT is the yield on short-term Treasury bills on the day of the new
issue, measured in basis points; MM is the size of the new issue, as a
multiple of $100 million; and ArT is the most recent one—month change
in rT. The conventional sign expectations for the associated coefficients are
2' 4 >0.A positive cost of carrying bonds in inventory, measured by
(rT -rN),would lead to a larger spread (rN -r)if it induced underwriters
to price a new issue so as to ensure a quick sale. A large issue size would—25—
lead to a large spread either because the marketrequired a concession for
size transactions or because of the greater risk to underwriters ofholding
more securities in syndicate. A rising interest rate level would lead to
a larger spread if it created expectations of weaker market conditions
ahead.
Table 4 presents the results of estimating (9) for each of the five
categories of new issues, first subject to the constraint == 0,next
subject only to the constraint =0,and finally subject to no constraint.
Although none of the coefficients on the three new variables included in (9)
is uniformly significant, all three typically exhibit theexpected positive
sign, and those on the issue size and expectation variables are at least
marginally significant at least half the time. In the first equation for
Aa—rated utilities, for example, 33 =.19indicates that an additional $100
million in issue size raises the new issue yield by 19 basis points after
allowance for all other factors. Similarly, in the firstequation for Baa—
rated utilities, 14 =.15indicates that a recent increase of 1% in short-
term interest rates raises the new issue yield by 15 basis points after
allowance for all other factors.
Although the inclusion of the three additional variables in (9) leads
to results that may shed interesting light on other questions, it does little
to alter the basic implications for the question of shift in eitherintercept
or coupon differential slope already contained in the results of estimating
(8). Once again the intercept shift is typically not significantly
different from zero when the slope shift constraint =0is in effect.
In the absence of constraints, is again uniformly positive and almost
uniformly negative, with significance levels somewhat greater than those












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The final column of Table 2 reports mean new issue versus seasoned
yield spreads that are again comparable to those shown in the second and
fourth columns but adjusted for coupon differential effects on the basis
of the respected sets of estimated '' and 61 values reported in
Table 4 for the form of (9) with both 6 andestimated freely. Once again
the prevalent increase is clearly apparent. For all five categories
combined, the mean adjusted spread was -14 basis points before October 1979
and 35 basis points after January 1980.
Finally, Table 5 presents F-statistics for a Chow test of the null
hypothesis of no change in the respective full sets ofcoefficients in
each of (8) and (9), across the 1977—79 and 1980—81 subsamples. These results
simply confirm the impression already given by the t-statistics of 6 and 61 in
Tables 3 and 418 For three of the five categories of new issues, there is
highly significant evidence of a change in the behavior of the market's new
issue pricing mechanism between the respective experience before and after
October 1979.TABLE 5
F-STATISTICS FOR BREAKINSPREADRELATIONSHIPS
qution (8) Equation (9)
Ma Bell Telephone Issues 12.34* 12.80*
Aa Utility Issues 4.14* 4.31*
BaaUtilityIssues 1.15 1.74
AaIndustrial Issues 2.17 1.13
A Industrial Issues 9.89* 12.48*
Note: *Signjfict at .01 level.—27—
III. Effects of Volatility on the Distribution of Bond Purchases
The evidence presented in Sections I and II, suggesting changes in the
operation of the U.S. long—term corporate capital market since October 1979,
focusesfirst on borrowing corporations and then on the market intermediary
as represented by the underwriting mechanism. The other side of the market,
ofcourse, is the lender -—thatis, the investor who ultimately holds
nonfinancial corporations' bonds. Just as nonfinancial corporations and
investment bankers may have changed their respective ways of doing business
in response to the increase in interest rate volatility, so too may portfolio
investors.
Even the most casual conversations with participants in the U.S.
corporate bond market in recent times almost inevitably lead to some form
of assertion that the behavior of investors in the market has indeed changed
during the past two years. The notion which most typically arises is that
purchasers oflong—term bonds have become "speculators" rather than "investors,
makingportfoliodecisions more on the basis of expectations of capital gain
(or fears of capital loss) over very short time horizons instead of assess-
ments of prevailing interest rates in the context of longer—run portfolio
objectives. To be sure, this process has been under way for many years,
as the bond market itself has become more liquid and interest rate (and
hence bond price) fluctuations have intensified since the relatively tran-
quil days of the early l960s, Even so, the overwhelming consensus among
market participants appears to be that the acceleration of this process
during the past two years has constituted a qualitatively new phenomenon.
If true, such a development would be at least consistent with —ifnot
directly due to —thesharp increase in interest rate volatility in this
period.
There are many senses in which it could be true that "speculation"—28—
has replaced "investment" as a mode of behavior on the lenders! side of
the bond market. The same individuals and institutions that played active
roles in the market before could still be doing so, but could have changed
their respective patterns of portfolio behavior. In addition --oralterna-
tively ——themore risk averse or far sighted individuals could have withdrawn
from the market, with other individuals who are more comfortable with risk
yet more concerned with short-run portfolio performance taking their places;
and a similar exchange of places could have occurred among institutions. While
both of these interpretations of the widespread perception of change are
entirely plausible, providing evidence to document or contradict either possi-
bility lies well beyond the scope of this paper.
another, more readily explored, sense in which the market's behavior
may have changed is that some specific classes of investors could have reduced
their participation, with other specific investor classes taking their place.
Because of the great diversity of legal and regulatory constraints under which
various kinds of financial institutions operate in the United States, not to
mention the divergence in specific practice appropriate to their respective
lines of business, different classes of institutions typically exhibit
sharply different portfolio behavior.'9 To the extent that such classes of
investors exhibit portfolio behavior which is more homogeneous within classes
than across classes, any shifts in the relative importance of specific classes'
market participation imply changes in the equilibrium characteristics of the
20
overall market.
Table 6 presents data for the last two decades showing the breakdown,
according to the classification of sectors in the Federal Reserve System's
flow—of—funds accounts, of all net purchases of corporate bonds issued in











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for the first fifteen years of this period, then individually for the five
years leading up to and including the October 1979 change in monetary policy
procedures, and then individually for the two subsequent years in which
interest rate volatility has been so much greater.
Although many regularities do emerge in an inspection of these data
—-forexample, the historical and continuing role of life insurance companies
and state—local government retirement funds as major providers of long—term
debt capital to business ——thedata also convey an impression of enormous
variation from year to year in the distribution of net bond purchases,
depending on the specific market circumstances. Just within the five years
1975—79, for example, the share of total net bond purchases accounted for by
life insurance companies varied from barely one—fourth to over one-half.
Similarly, households accounted for more than one—fourth of all net purchases
in 1976 and nearly one—third in 1979, but were themselves net sellers of
corporate bonds in each of the two interveningyears.21
Against the background of this substantial variation, the chief
aspects of the distribution of bond purchases since October 1979 that have
been clearly out of the ordinary all occurred during 1981: the unprecedented
liquidation of bond holdings by households, the unprecedented absorption
of bonds by securities brokers and dealers, and the unprecedented absorption
of bonds by foreign investors. During the first three quarters of last
year (the latest period for which data are available at the timeof writing),
the net sale of bonds by households exceeded the market's entire net new
isue volume. In other words, because of net selling by households, all
other classes of investors together absorbed more than twice the net amount
of bonds that would have been necessary to clear the market if the only
net "sales" had come from net new borrowing by corporate issuers. Securities—30—
brokers arid dealers and foreign investors, however, increased their bond
purchases by well over a factor of two.
The massive liquidation of bond portfolios by households in 1981was
clearly extraordinary, but its connection to the post October 1979 increase
in interest rate volatility is hardly obvious. Notonly was there no such
liquidation in 1980, but that which occurred during 1981 tookplace entirely
in the second and third quarters of the year. These six monthswere a peak
period for long—term interest rates, and many individualsmay have been
responding more to the opportunity to create tax losses before the 1981
legislation lowered marginal tax rates than to any aversion tovolatility
per se. More broadly, still other factors like the weakness of personal
income associated with the renewed recession in businessactivity may also
have been partly responsible. In the absence of a specific model ofhouseholds'
portfolio behavior that allows for as many such factors as possible --in
short, an analog to the model of nonfinancial corporations' borrowing behavior
in (5) —-nostrong inference linking this shift in households' bond market
activity to interest rate volatility is warranted.22
The increasedshare of net bond purchases accounted for bysecurities
brokersanddealers and by foreign investors is more clearly consistent
with the commonly perceived shift in the market's character.Wholly apart
from the question of whether the increase in interest ratevolatility per
se motivated these two investor groups' increased participation, they are
more likely to exhibit "speculative" behavior than are the traditional
major bond investors like life insurance companies and pension funds.
In sum, despite an unprecedented change in households' bond market
portfoliobehavior since October 1979, andan accompanyingchangein that of
securitiesbrokers and dealers and foreign investors, there is no clear—31—
evidence that the increase in interest rate volatility has altered behavior
on the lenders' side of the U.S. corporate bond market.—32--
IV. Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented in this paper leads to three conclusions about
possible effects on the U.S. long-term capital raising mechanism due to the
sharp increase in interest rate volatility that has followed the Federal
Reserve System's adoption of new monetary policy procedures in 1979. First,
the increased volatility has probably led nonfinancial corporations to finance
less of their external funds requirements at long term than they would other-
wise have done. Second, the increased volatility has probably led underwriters
of high grade corporate bonds to increase the spread of a typical new issue's
yield over the prevailing market yield on comparable bonds already outstanding.
Third, there is little firm basis (reported here, anyway) to conclude that
the increased volatility in particular has affected investors' portfolio
behavior in the bond market.
Each of these three conclusions (especially the two positive ones)
bears treating with substantial caution. The experience from October 1979 to
date spans too short an interval to support any judgment with confidence,
given the difficulties that always hinder economic inference. Moreover, the
specific aspects of economic behavior under scrutiny here ——corporate
finance, investment banking, and portfolio investment —-aresufficiently
imperfectly understood at a quantitative level to render sharp judgments
risky even on the basis of more ample data. Further, the research reported
in this paper carries none of the three separate analyses conducted to the
full depth feasible within even the limited data and analytical tools
available.
Even so, the conclusions reached here about the effects of increased
interest rate volatility on the capital raising mechanism are suggestive.
Becausethe potential economic consequences of significantly impairing that—33—
mechanism are great, even these tentative conclusions should serve both as
a warning of caution for public policy andasa spur to further research.Footnotes
*Iam grateful to Glenn Hubbard for research assistance and valuable
discussions; to Lewis Friedman, Mark Seigel and James Stewart of Morgan
Stanley & Co., Incorporated, for useful suggestions and especially for
their help in gathering primary data on securities issues and yields;
to Irving Auerbach, Philip Cagan, John Makin, and other conference
participants, for helpful colrifflents on an earlier draft; and to the National
Science Foundation (grant SESl—12673) and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
for research support.
1. It is always possible, of course, that the increase in interest rate
volatility since October 1979 has occurred for reasons unrelated to the
change in Federal Reserve operating procedures. An analysis of the
effects of that volatility would still be useful in that case, but
its conclusions would then carry no implications for monetary policy.
2. The analysis focuses on a subset of the effects investigated empirically
by Johnson et al. [10] and considered at the a priori level by Lombra
and Struble [14]; see both papers for references to the relevant earlier
literature on interest rate volatility.
3. See Friedman and Role; [9] for a proof of this proposition, together with
expressions deriving the and it,in(1) from the parameters of the
joint distribution of the yield asessments and the borrower's (or
investor's) coefficient of relative risk aversion. The form of (1) used
in Friedman [7] also allowed for several non—yield influences on portfolio
selection, but none of these proved statistically significant in the
estimated equation presented below; see foothote 6.
4. See Friedman [51 for the development of the optimal marginal adjustment
model, and Friedman [71 for its application in the context of corporationst
choice of liabilities.
5. The time shapes of these "average" expectations depend on the results of
a dynamic programing optimization involving, among other factors, the
associated perceived variances and covariances; see the model of call—
deferred optimal financing in Bodie and Friedman [2].
6. The equationpresented here also omits several non—yield variables
included InFriedman[7],aswell as the expected inflation proxy
includedin Friedman [6]. Despite the a priori expectation of a nonzero
coefficient in the expanded model, in each case preliminary experimentation
did not indicate a value significantly different from zero. For the
retained earnings and fixed investment variables, the most important of
the non—yield influences in [71, the estimated coefficients (and t—
statistics) were 0.6275 (1.5) and 0.04277 (0.1), respectively. For
the expected inflation proxythe estimated coefficient was —0.02577(—0.4).
7. AllyandcSvaluesin (6)and (7) havet—statistics in excess of 1.9
excep 1l l3 and 2 Therole of the unitsum constraintis to permit
identificationof the corresponding coefficients in (5), andthe inter-
pretationof those two coefficients is of course conditional on the unitsum constraint. The estimation procedure used here also constrains each
set of lag weights to follow a third-degree polynomial pattern, with the
right-hand tial of the lag constrained to pass through zero, and with
each lead weight (Yo or ti) free of the polynomial constraint but still
included in the unit sum constraint. See Friedman [7] for further
details of the estimation process.
8. A third important aspect of the equation's post-sample over-prediction
is that these data on "actual long—term borrowing" in fact include both
long- and intermediate—term issues. The shift in the mix of new issue
maturities from long to intermediate term during the last two years
furthercompounds the result shown here.
9. Simply introducing aninterest rate volatility measure on the right-
hand side of (5) leads, as would be expected, to a negative coefficient
that is significant at the 5% level when the equation is estimated
over 1960:11 —1981:11,but not over 1960:11 —1979:111.For all of the
reasons advanced above, however, such a finding is of questionable
value. Practically any variable that has shown a sudden increase
after mid 1979 would produce similar results.
10. The t-statistics for the three individual coefficient shifts were 2.8
for Bl' -2.5 for B2 and -3.0 for B3
11. The predicted values shown in Table 1 rely on period-by-period updating
of all right-hand side variables in (5), including the lagged interest
rate observations in (6) and (7).
12. Adding an interest rate volatility measure to any standard unrestricted
reduced—form term—structure equation, estimated directly with the long-
term yield as the dependent variable, would presumably result in a
significantly positive coefficient. It is not clear what such an
exercise would contribute to understanding of interest rate relationships,
however;see again foothote 9.
13.Researchers investigating the underwriting of new equity issues have
found more mixed results on this question, although the respective
hypotheses for the cases of bond and stock issues are not fully
comparable. See, for example, Scholes [15], Logue [13] and Stoll [16].
14. A break—down between issues priced by negotiation versus competitive
bidding, within the utility (and post-1979 Bell Telephone) groups,
showed no apparent differences that would warrant allowing for this
distinction in the analysis that follows. The omission of the final
three months of 1979, on the ground that underwriters would have needed
some time to observe the increase in interest rate volatility before
reacting to it, has essentially no effect on the results reported here
(and in Tables 3—5 below) because there were so few issues during those
months. For the five categories of issues shown in the table, the
numbers of new issues during October—December 1979 were, respectively,
2,6, 1, 0 and 0.15. Following Conard and Frankena, an alternative approach would be to
construct a separate yield index with average coupon identical to that
of each new issue. This approach would be difficult to implement,
not only because of the amount of data manipulation required but also
because of the need for tenuously based interpolation and extrapolation
for many issues.
16. More specifically, assume that the composition of the index is fixed
and that the bonds in the index are priced at par on average over time,
so that the mean seasoned index coupon is ks =swhere i is the mean
observed value of rS during the sample period. Also assume that each
new issue is priced at par and —nowabstracting from the yield effect
of the coupon differential —ata yield equal to that on comparable
seasoned issues, so that the coupon on any new issue is kN =rc.(
the discussion below explains, each of these assumptions introduces
a bias of known sign in what follows,) If the relationship between the
yield spread and the coupon differential is the linear rN -rS=
c+13(kN-ks),then substituting and rearranging yields (8) where, apart
from the durruny variable, o =- Fsand l =3.Because the equation
includes an intercept, there is no implication that the level of
is a proxy for the level of the coupon differential.
17. The two values reported for each category of bonds are, first,
+ftFswhere ?s is the 1977—79 mean of rS and, second, 13j+ +
÷i1s where s is the 1980—81 mean of rS. See again footnote 16.
18. For (8) this result is to be expected, in that the F-statistic just shows
the joint significance of o and51 together. For (9) the F—statistic
applies to a test for no change not only in and but also in 2' 3
and
19.See, for example, the evidence along these lines presented in Friedman [5].
20.See Lintner [12] and Friedman [81for proofs of this proposition in two
differentcontexts.
21. Households cannot issuenew corporate bonds, of course; net sales
representan excess of aggregategross sales of bonds already held in
portfoliosover aggregate gross purchases. The household sector of the
flow-of—funds accounts consists primarily of individuals but also
includesnon—profit institutions and bank—managed personal trusts.
22. The converse is also true for the other investor classes. Post 1979
behavior that appears ordinary enough on casual inspection may be
unusual in the context of a model allowing for independent factors.
n approach to this problem analogous to that employed in Section I
would be to estimate the six bond demand equations developed in Friedman [51
using data through 1979:111, and then test the estimated relationships
using post-sample data. Such an investigation lies beyond the scope of
this paper.References
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